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Strikebreakers, The Supreme Court, and

Belknap, Inc. v. Hale: The Continuing
Erosion of Federal Labor Preemption
INTRODUCTION

T

HE scales of justice, which balance the interests of one party
against those of another, is a popular symbol depicting society's method of resolving legal disputes. In the adjudication of labor disputes, however, the scales may balance more than the interests of the parties, for a heavy thumb is often firmly planted on
one side of the scale. This "rule of thumb," adding weight to one
of the sides of the scale, reinforces one of the parties' interests
with the public policy embodied in the National Labor Relations
Act.' The Act, with the body of substantive law that has arisen
from it, seeks to define the process of collective bargaining
deemed necessary to preserve the federal interest in labor peace. 2
Federal labor policy mandates how parties are to act in certain situations. At times, this carefully created model of behavior
may conflict with state law. For instance, the imposition of state
tort liability may proscribe behavior mandated by federal policy.
Preemption of state law and state law causes of action may then be
required to preserve the integrity of the federal model of the collective bargaining process.
In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,3 the Supreme Court, affirming a deci29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the NLRA, or "the Act"].
Section 1(b) of the Act states:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the
other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982).
1.
2.

3.

103 S.Ct. 3172 (1983).
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sion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky,4 held that terminated
strikebreakers' private causes of action for breach of contract and
misrepresentation should not be preempted by federal labor law.
In so holding the Court found the existing rationales for preemption inapplicable, because in allowing these suits it could "perceive
no substantial impact on the settlement of . . . strikes . .

.-

This Comment contests that conclusion.
To see how Belknap represents a continuing contraction of
the rules of federal preemption, the prior cases establishing those
rules must be examined. Part I of this Comment shall review the
immediate history and purpose of the federal preemption doctrine
which the Court found did not apply in Belknap. Part II will examine the specific holdings of Belknap, and will explore and critique the Court's reasoning as to why preemption did not apply.
Part III will review the doctrine of "permanent replacement" and
the effects that Belknap will have, through this doctrine, on management, labor, the National Labor Relations Board, and the
strikebreakers themselves.
In its decision, the Court "balanced" the state's interest in
regulating common law torts committed against the strikebreakers
with the perceived federal interest in the freedom of management
conduct, and found that the former outweighed the latter. In this
process, however, the Court ignored the realities of its decision.
After Belknap, management's conduct will still not be regulated
through the imposition of state tort liability. While the strikebreakers may now sue in state court, they will not win; although
nominally "permanent" replacements, they are employees at will."
Management's interests are therefore hardly impinged.
What the decision in Belknap does accomplish, however, is to
severely undercut the interests of the striking workers, a factor
ignored in the Court's decision. In a functional analysis, management loses little in Belknap, and is indeed granted a potent new
economic weapon.7 This Comment suggests that the Court was
both incorrect in its balancing of state and federal interests, and
shortsighted as to the extremely deleterious effects on labor-management relations that allowing these suits under state law will
4. Hale v. Belknap, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
5. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3180.
6. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
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I.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

The Court has recognized a clear purpose for federal preemption in the labor context: "Congress evidently considered that
centralized administration of specially designed procedures was
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules
and to avoid those diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.' In order to have an effective, uniform and national labor
policy, it is necessary that conflicting state laws be preempted. As
an explication of the history of federal preemption in the labor
context would involve a long excursion into early labor decisions
that is clearly beyond the scope of this Comment,9 the present discussion is instead limited to the doctrine as discussed in Belknap.
Federal labor preemption doctrine divides roughly into two
branches. The first is the "free use of economic weapons" analysis
of Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,"° which adapted the balance of
power analysis of Teamster's Union v. Morton.1 The second branch

of federal labor preemption doctrine is the primary jurisdiction
analysis of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon. 2

The focus of the Machinists doctrine is the proscription of
state regulation of conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated, "to be 'unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate'
because it was among the permissible 'economic weapons left in
reserve .

. .

. [A]ctual exercise [of these weapons]

. . .

by the par-

ties is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and TaftHartley Acts have recognized.' "13 Under this analysis, state law
8.

Garner v. Teamsters' Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).

9.

For a general history and overview of the current status of preemption doctrine,

two articles by Archibald Cox are indispensible. See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Cox, Recent Developments in FederalLabor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. LJ. 277 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Recent Developments]. A
shorter, although less comprehensive, analysis can be found in Recent Development, States
Are Pre-empted From Regulating Use of Peaceful Economic Weapons by Parties during Collective
Bargaining,45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1254 (1980).
10. 427 U.S. 132, 141 (1976).
11. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
12. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
13. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141 (emphasis in original) (quoting NLRB v. Insurance
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and state law causes of action that interfere with the economic
weapons intended to be left free by the Act clearly frustrate the
processes of the federal labor relations system. Machinists holds
that such regulation must be preempted to preserve a closed federal system of labor-management relations.
The reason that these economic weapons must be left "free"
from state regulation is the same as that which the Court articulated to protect them from federal regulation in NLRB v. Insurance Agents:1 the fear that through the regulation of bargaining
conduct, government may determine the substantive terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. "[I]f the Board could regulate
the choice of economic weapons that may be used as a part of
collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties
contract .

.

. .

The outcome of the collective bargaining pro-

cess designed by Congress, according to the Court, should depend
solely upon the balance of power between labor and management:
If [state] law . ..can be applied to proscribe the same type of conduct
which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe. . . the inevitable result
would be to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon
of self-help available, and to upset the balance of power between labor and
management expressed in our national labor policy.1

The Court's intended model for the collective bargaining relationship requires that weapons of self-help be left for the free
disposal of the parties. A state law that would interfere with the
balance of power created by the free use of economic weapons
that Congress purposefully left unregulated would clearly be conAgents, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960)). In Machinists, the employer brought identical unfair
labor practice charges before the NLRB and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, claiming that the workers' concerted refusal to work overtime during contract
negotiations was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(3) (1982). The NLRB rejected the claim, holding that the conduct did "not violate
the NLRA," 427 U.S. at 132, and therefore "was not conduct cognizable by the Board
...." Id. The Wisconsin Commission, on the other hand, found the workers' action (or
rather inaction) was a violation of section 111 .06(2)(h) of its state labor law. Wis. STAT. §
11 1.06(2)(h) (1974). The conflict between state and federal law was clear; the Court held
that "such regulation by.the State is impermissible because it 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Machinists, 427 U.S. at 150-51 (quoting Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945)).
14. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
15. Id. at 490.
16. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964).
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trary to federal policy. To maintain the viability of that federal

policy, then, conflicting state law must be preempted.1

If this conduct is to be regulated at all, moreover, it must be

regulated by the federal government through the National Labor
Relations Board. This, the second branch of preemption analysis,
is the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine of San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon.' s Under Garmon, if the conduct of the parties
is prohibited by sections 7 or 8 of the Act,19 it must be proscribed
solely by the Act. That conduct protected by the Act, on the other
hand, is to be protected from state as well as federal regulation:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State
purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.. . . [W]hen an
activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board
if the danger of state interference with national policy is to
20
be averted.

This doctrine is not universal, however; an exception exists to
the Garmon rule. In the opinion itself, the Court recognized that
some situations, traditionally within the ambit of local concern,
might warrant state regulation:
[W]here the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern to the Labor
Management Relations Act . . . [o]r where the regulated conduct touched
interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.2
17. In Machinists, the Court insisted that the parties' actions were to be "unrestricted
by any governmental power to regulate." Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141 (emphasis in original)
(quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89). This is not to say, however,
that these employee actions were going to remain wholly unregulated. The employee conduct in Machinists and Insurance Agents was still "regulated" in the sense that their actions
were held to be beyond the scope of section 7-unprotected by the NLRA. As such, their
employer was free to dismiss them for such activity. While an injunction, such as that
sought in Machinists, is certainly a potent regulator of employee activity, it pales in comparison with the possibility of termination. It is clear, then, that the Court's analysis, by not
including such employee action under the protective ambit of section 7, is effectively
prohibiting that activity.
18. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 147, 148 (1982).
20. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 24445.
21. Id. at 243-44. The interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" that
trigger this exception may not have roots particularly deep. Cf. Farmer v. Carpenters, 430
U.S. 290 (1977), where the Court allowed state tort law recovery for the intentional inflic-
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For preemption under the Garmon doctrine, then, there is a
"balancing" of interests: the federal government's interest in enforcing its labor policy is balanced against the state's interest in
regulating those matters traditionally left to state jurisdiction.
The Court seemed to expand this exception to the Garmon
rule in Sears v. Carpenters,22 which allowed a state court injunction
against area standards picketing 23 on private property. In his analysis in Sears, Justice Stevens separated the Garmon doctrine into
two parts: regulation of conduct arguably prohibited, and that arguably protected, by the NLRA.24 For those actions arguably prohibited by the Act, Justice Stevens saw no conflict in the allowance
of joint state and federal liability unless the question presented
before each jurisdiction was identical:
tion of emotional distress, a tort generally considered "new." See W. PROSSER & W.
PROSSER

& KEETON

ON

KEETON,

TORTS, § 12 (5th ed. 1984).

22. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
23. "Area standards picketing" is the picketing of a non-union employer by union
members for the purpose of ensuring that union-level wages are being paid to the nonunion workers at a particular job site-i.e., that the wages and benefits comport with "area
standards." This is done in the hope that the open shop's existence shall not depress the
wage rates of union workers elsewhere. If the picketing should be for the purpose of organizing the workers of the non-union employer, on the other hand, there is additional
regulation of the activity under section 8(b)(7). 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1982). See, e.g., Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett), 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962) (area standards picketing held to be outside the scope of section 8(b)(7)).
24. Another classification of preempted conduct was defined in Garmon, one not mentioned in either Sears or Belknap: conduct neither protected nor prohibited by the Act, yet
still preempted from state regulation. Under Garmon, the question of state jurisdiction
could arise only when the Board had expressly decided that the activity in question was
neither protected nor prohibited by the Act, 359 U.S. at 245. The. Court, in an opinion by
Justice Frankfurter, held that if the Board had made no such determination, and the conduct was arguably protected or prohibited, it was to be outside the realm of state regulation, even if the Board did not decide, or refused to decide, the issue:
[T]he Board may also fail to determine the status of the disputed conduct by
declining to assert jurisdiction, or by refusal of the General Counsel to file a
charge, or by adopting some other disposition which does not define the nature
of the activity with unclouded legal significance . . . . The failure of the Board
to define the legal significance under the Act . . . does not give the States the
power to act . . . . The governing consideration is that to allow the States to
control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too
great a danger of conflict with national labor policy.
Id. at 245-46 (emphasis in original). Machinists, decided some sixteen years after Garmon,
stands as an example of this classification. Although the NLRB in Machinists held that the
workers' refusal to work overtime was not prohibited by the Act, 427 U.S. at 135, the
conduct was never determined to be protected activity. See supra note 13. Sears, then, can
be seen as a contraction of both branches of federal labor preemption.
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The critical inquiry, therefore, is . . . whether the controversy presented to
the state court is identical to (as in Garner)or different from (as in Farmer)
that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board. For
it is only in the former situation that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction
necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon
doctrine was designed to avoid.25

The only danger Justice Stevens foresaw with the dual liability
arising from arguably prohibited activity was one of conflicting
remedy. Because of this analysis, a distinction was made between
conflicting state law of "general applicability" and conflicting
state labor law: "It is also evident that enforcement of a law of
general applicability is less likely to generate rules or remedies
which conflict with federal policy than the invocation of a special
remedy under a state labor relations law." 2
If, on the other hand, state law were to regulate or prohibit
those activities specifically protected by the Act, the risk of state
law interference would obviously be much higher-although even
such an obvious clash of state and federal policy would not be dispositive. In Sears, the particular facts of the arguably protected
conduct were held to require the employer to seek redress in state
court. As the picketing in Sears was for area standards, no relationship existed between the employer and the union. Because of
25. Sears, 436 U.S. at 197.
26. Id. at 197 n.27. Although unstated by justice Stevens, this was a clear reversal of
Garmon. Under Garmon, once the Board determines that the activity in question was either
protected or prohibited under the Act, the states were unequivocally barred from any exercise of jurisdiction. justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Garmon stated flatly: "If the
Board decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial review, that conduct is protected by §
7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the States are ousted of all
jurisdiction." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245. The absence of such a determination, moreover,
did not give the states jurisdiction. See supra note 24.

The Sears conflict-of-remedy analysis is disingenuous when compared with Garmon, the
case that it ostensibly upholds. justice Stevens' argument, and the logic supporting it, was
explicitly rejected by the Garmon Court:
Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be left free from
state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can
be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is
designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.
Even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation
for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.
Id. at 246-47.
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this, Sears could not bring charges before the Board to resolve all
questions of unfair labor practices: while entitled to file charges of
union violations of section 8(b),27 the employer could not file, and
was not able to induce the union to file, charges of an 8(a) violation. ' 8 Consequently, since the employer could not have had all of
the possible questions regarding protected activity brought before
the Board, the Court held that preemption was inappropriate:
The primary-jurisdiction rationale unquestionably requires that when the
same controversy may be presented to the state court and the NLRB, it must
be presented to the Board. But that rationale does not extend to cases in
which an employer has no acceptable method of invoking, or inducing the
Union to invoke, the jurisdiction of the Board.2

The effect of Sears is somewhat questionable, given the reliance of the majority opinion on the particular facts at bar. As a
guide for future conduct, the decision is ambiguous. Of the sixjustice majority, Justices Blackmun and Powell disagreed as to
whether a state could exercise jurisdiction anywhere but this "no
man's land" created by the lack of standing of one of the
parties.30
In Belknap, the Court recognized this bifurcated preemption
doctrine. Both the Machinists doctrine, protecting the use of economic weapons left free by the Act (and the balance of power between management and labor) and the primary jurisdiction analysis of Garmon were recognized. Neither, however, was applied.
27. Sears, 436 U.S. at 186.
28. Id. at 200-02. It is interesting to note, however, that the question presented by the
possible 8(a) violations was whether the union's picketing was protected activity-specifically whether Sear's actions in retaliation thereto were unfair labor practices.
Even if there had been a contractual relationship between the employer and the union that
would give the employer the requisite standing to bring these charges, it is unlikely at best
that the employer would ever file such a charge-against itself.
29. Id. at 202.
30. Id. at 208-14. One year later, in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), the Court handed down an even more bewildering opinion,
holding that New York was not preempted from paying unemployment benefits to striking
workers. There was no majority: three justices formed a plurality, three dissented and
'three concurred, all with various preemption analyses. All of the justices agreed, however,
that a balance of power was created by the NLRA that should not (to some degree) be
interfered with by the states. See Cox, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 293.
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BELKNAP, INC.
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v. HALE

Facts and PriorProceedings

At the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement,
Belknap Inc. and the Teamster's Union reached an impasse in
their negotiations. On February 1, 1978, about 400 workers went

out on strike. Belknap then instituted a unilateral wage increase,
effective that day, for those union employees who stayed on the

job. The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge as a result of
this action. Almost immediately, Belknap advertised for and hired
a number of "permanent replacements." After the replacements
were hired, they signed a statement prepared by the company denoting the particular union member that the strikebreaker would
"permanently replace." ' Later, the company made additional
representations to the strikebreakers to the effect that "we have

no intention of getting rid of the permanent replacement employees just in order to provide jobs for the replaced strikers if and
when the Union calls off the strike. ' 32 Even after the Regional
Director of the Board had issued a complaint against Belknap for
the unilateral wage increase (which, if found to be an unfair labor
practice, would mandate the return of all the strikers to their
jobs), the company asserted to the strikebreakers that "there will
be no change in your employment status . .

.,.

31. As originally enacted, settion 13 of the National Labor Relations Act provided
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed so as to either interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike." If interpreted literally, this provision certainly
would prohibit management's hiring of permanent replacements. It is difficult to imagine a
more effective disincentive for employee job actions than management's ability to give the
striking worker's job to another. The concept of permanent replacements, moreover, is not
discussed in the Act; references to permanent replacements in the legislative history are
also absent. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized (and indeed, given the language of the
Act, recreated) an employer's "right to protect and continue his business by supplying
places left vacant by strikers" almost from the Act's inception. NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
The reason this was done is at best unclear, given the seemingly facial contradiction
with the statute. One commentator has suggested that this dictum in Mackay-the propriety of permanent replacements was not even a question before the Court-was "designed
to assuage fears, predominantly felt by employers, concerning the impact of the Wagner
Act; it does not speak to employees or their unions, nor does it seem particularly concerned that the Wagner Act was designed to grant economic rights, and thus power, to
workers." J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 19 (1983).

32. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3175.
33. Id.
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Immediately before the adjudication of the unfair labor practice charge, the Regional Director mediated a settlement between
the company and the Union. In return for the dismissal of all unfair labor practice charges, thirty-five strikers were to be recalled
per week. To accommodate these workers, the replacements were
terminated.
The terminated strikebreakers then sued Belknap in state
court for breach of contract and misrepresentation. The strikebreakers claimed that Belknap, at the time of their hiring, knew
that the advertisement for "permanent" positions was false and
that the replacements would rely on it to their detriment, and that
their termination as a result of the union settlement constituted a
breach of their employment contract. Each strikebreaker demanded a total of $500,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages.
Belknap was awarded summary judgment by the trial court on
the preemption issue. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that preemption was not appropriate for two reasons.
First, Belknap's actions were held not to be unfair labor practices,
because the strikebreakers "were non-union workers who sought
full-time employment with the appellee, rather than membership
in any particular labor organization.

'3 4

Second, Belknap's conduct

leading to the breach of contract and misrepresentation claims
was held to be "a merely peripheral concern of the N.L.R.B. Conversely, the alleged behavior greatly involve[d] local feeling and
responsibility that should be subject to the jurisdiction of the state
courts." 35 The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but later vacated its order as having been improvidently
entered.
B.

The Supreme Court Opinion

The issue before the Court in Belknap was thus whether the
suits brought by the strikebreakers for breach of contract and
misrepresentation were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The Court held that they were not. The majority opinion is a mechanical application of the preemption doctrine outlined above to the facts of Belknap. The Court's analysis, however,
34. Hale v. Belknap, Inc., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2397, 2398 (Ky. Ct. App, 1981).
35. Id.
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is inconsistent. At times, the underlying rationale of the cases used
to support the majority opinion is not fully developed, resulting in
a superficial application of the law that gives short shrift to the
traditional concerns of federal labor policy.
Belknap, with supporting amicus briefs filed by the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States and the NLRB, argued that the
hiring and termination of permanent replacements was an economic weapon that Congress intended to be left at the disposal of
the parties-the Machinists doctrine.3 6 If these state tort suits were
allowed, it was argued, management would be inhibited from
making use of this traditional economic weapon, preserved by the
Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. some forty years
before-despite the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act.3 8 Moreover, they argued, the imposition of tort liability
would inhibit the federal policy favoring strike settlement.
The Court held the Machinists doctrine inapplicable by limiting the doctrine itself. While Justice White acknowledged the necessity for the free use of economic weapons, 9 he limited their
use by the assertion that they may not be used to injure "innocent
third parties. ' 40 Similarly, although the broad federal policy in
favor of strike settlement was acknowledged, the Court held that
the policy could not be used to shield management conduct in the
face of such injury.4 1
The Court also rejected the argument that the allowance of
such suits would be an impermissible state intrusion into the balance of power in labor-management relations. In dicta, it was held
that "conditioning" 42 the offers of permanent replacement would
not diminish management's ability to hire permanent replacements, and hence change the balance of power between -manage36. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
37. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
38. See supra note 3 1.
39. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3178.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Justice White suggested that to avoid tort liability in the future, management
should "condition" its offers of permanent replacement. The offers would be conditioned
"by stating the circumstances under which replacements must be fired;" i.e., if the adjudication of an unfair labor practice transforms the economic strike into one for unfair labor
practices, in which case federal law would mandate the return of the strikers to their jobs,
or if the company settles with the union. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3179.
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ment and labor.43 This belief apparently stemmed from Justice
White's somewhat unique view of management's pre-Belknap offers of permanent replacement. In response to Belknap's assertion
that such "conditioning" would weaken management's position,
Justice White stated that if management could fire permanent
replacements at will,
[a]ny offer of permanent employment to replacements is thus necessarily
conditional and non-permanent. This view of the law would inevitably become widely known and deter honest employers from making promises that
they know they are not legally obligated to keep. . .. [R]eplacements would
know that the proffered job is, in important respects, non-permanent and
may not accept employment for that reason."

Under this analysis, offers of permanent replacement prior to
Belknap would not have been particularly helpful to management,
as the replacements would have understood the real nature of the
offer. If this were so, however, and the replacements did understand the nature of "permanent replacement," it is difficult to see
how the strikebreakers' cause of action for misrepresentation can
stand-and indeed why allowing it is so important that the substantial federal interests underlying the very existence of preemption doctrine must be sacrificed.
The Court also dismissed the effect of "conditioning" these
offers 45 on the legal status of the replacement. After Belknap, "conditional" offers of employment serve two logically inconsistent
functions. While the replacements' status would be "conditional"
to prevent management's liability in state court, their status would
be "permanent" when considering the strikers' return to their
jobs:
An employment contract with a replacement promising permanent employment, subject only to settlement with its employees' union and to a
Board unfair labor practice order directing reinstatement of the strikers,
would not in itself render the replacement a temporary employee subject to
displacement by a striker over the employer's objection during or at the end
43. Id. Both Belknap and the Board argued that employers would be deterred from

making offers of permanent replacement if these state suits were allowed, as employers
may beforced to reinstate strikers-either by order of the Board, or by the necessity to sign
a settlement agreement. This would both weaken management's position, it was argued,
and deter settlement itself. Id. at 3178. Without the granting of permanent employment,
"it would be difficult to secure sufficient replacements to keep the business operating." Id.
44. Id. at 3178-79.
45. See supra note 42.
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of what is proved to be a purely economic strike.'8

Finally, the Court asserted that there is no conflict between
the employment contract of the replacement and the collective
bargaining agreement, even with the inclusion of the strikebreakers in the bargaining unit. The Court avoided a discussion of a
specific performance remedy, which would involve a direct conflict of remedy between the state court-reinstatement of the
strikebreakers-and the unfair labor practice determination of
the NLRB, because the strikebreakers had sued only for damages
in state court.
The Court allowed the conflict between state law and the
NLRA for these other remedies through the use of an "exception" to the general rule of J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB.47 In Case, the
Court held that terms of individual employment contracts between the employer and the worker must give way to the provisions of the collective bargaining process. The basis of the Court's
argument in Belknap comes from the proviso in Case that the
Board "has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect of such
contracts except as to their effects on matters within its jurisdiction. ''4 The Court's analysis would allow the "separate contracts
of employment" with the replacements to stand, even though the
replacements were to be considered part of the bargaining unit,49
because the provisions of the individual contracts in question were
seen as not within, and having "no effects on matters within, ' ' 0
the jurisdiction of the Board.
The Court rejected Belknap's argument over the applicability
46. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3179.
47. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
48. Id. at 340.
49. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3181 (emphasis added).
50. At the outset of the strike, Belknap instituted a unilateral wage increase, an unfair
labor practice under sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. See NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736, 743 (1962) ("an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment undernegotiation is similarly a violation of § 8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the duty to
negotiate. . ."). After this increase, Belknap's offers of permanent employment would arguably have been prohibited as threats not to reinstate the unfair labor practice strikers, as
well as misrepresentation actionable under state law. The "breach of the employment contract" with the replacements could similarly be seen as protected (indeed, mandated) by the
finding of an unfair labor practice. The obvious counter-argument-that the strike was
never determined to be one for unfair labor practices-is easily dismissed, as the Garmon
doctrine extends not only to those actions protected or prohibited by the Act, but to those
arguably so as well.
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of the Garmon doctrine as well. Whether or not Belknap's actions
were either arguably protected or prohibited under the Act was
deemed immaterial, because of the "identical question" analysis of
Sears v. Carpenters:5"
It is true that whether the strike was an unfair labor practice strike and
whether the offer to replacements was the kind of offer forbidden during
such a dispute were matters for the Board. The focus of the determinations,
however, would be on whether the rights of strikers were being infringed.
Neither controversy would have anything in common with the question
whether Belknap made
misrepresentations to replacements that were action52
able under state law.

The Garmon doctrine was thus quickly disposed of because
the question before the state court find that which would have
been brought before the Board were not "identical." Because of
this, "such an action is of no more than peripheral concern to the
Board and the federal law .

. .

. The state interests involved in

the case clearly outweigh any possible interference with the
Board's function that may result from permitting the action for
misrepresentation to proceed." '
C. Analytical Shortcomings
There are several legal flaws in the application of the preexisting preemption doctrines by the majority opinion. Some of
these are pointed out by the accompanying concurrence and dissent; many of the analytical gaps, however, are shared by the entire Court.
In the majority opinion, Justice White insisted that Congress
could not have intended the "free use of economic weapons" to
harm "innocent third parties."" No reference was made, how51.

436 U.S. 180 (1978).

52. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3183. It is equally true, however, that the state court in
question could not adjudicate questions of infringement of-strikers' rights. The loss of strikers'jobs to the strikebreakers raises the issue of a possible section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice violation, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), specifically, whether the employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or any term or condition of employment ...
discourage[d] membership in any labor organization." Id. In addition, a state court proceeding could not address the strikebreakers' rights for unfair labor practices committed
against them. See infra note 87.
53. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3183.
54. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. It is of course true that all
strikes-including those protected by the Act-have precisely this effect.
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ever, to the legislative history of the Act or to the applicable case
law in order to either document that assertion or establish that
strikebreakers are indeed "innocent." 5 The analysis of congressional intent seems to be nothing more than the application of
"common sense"-an "of course" determination without any inquiry into the real intent of the law.56
In his dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that the majority had
not dealt with the proper question. Instead of focusing on the effect on third parties, the focus of the decision-and the application of the preemption doctrine-should have been on the resolution of conflict between federal and state regulation of the same
activity.

7

The basis of this preemption-the Machinists doctrine-has
its roots in the federal preservation of the balance of power between management and labor. 8 Under the majority's holding,
management must "condition" its offers of employment to strike
replacements in order to escape potential state liability; 59 this is

justified because it will have "no effect" on the balance of power
between labor and management.60 This assumption, however, is
simply not true. In some cases, such "conditioning" of the permanent replacement offers may severely hinder management's ability
to use that economic weapon." More likely, management may
turn the possibility of civil liability into an effective new weapon to
55. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2d Cir. 1938), where Judge
Learned Hand summed up the position of strikebreakers:
It is of course true that the consequences are harsh to those who have taken the
strikers' places; strikes are always harsh; it might have been better to forbid
them .

. .

. But with that we have nothing to do; as between those who ha.ve

used a lawful weapon and those whose protection will limit its use, the second
must yield; and indeed, it is probably true today that most men taking jobs so
made vacant, realize from the outset how tenuous is their hold.
56. Justice White may have based this decision on "law" other than that of federal
labor policy. One commentator has suggested that 19th century notions of the masterservant relationship have survived to permeate the field despite the overriding principles of
the NLRA. See generally J. ATLSON, supra note 31.
57.

See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Lockridge states

that "the constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever particular field of law they
operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority over the subject matter."
403 U.S. at 285-86.
58. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 42.
60. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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undermine the position of the union. 2
In Belknap, the majority concluded that the conditioning of
offers of replacement will have no effect on the status of strikebreakers as "permanent" replacements, who may keep the jobs at
the end of an economic strike; this assertion, however, is unfounded on prior law. Prior to Belknap, economic strikers' jobs
could be eliminated only by the employer's showing of "legitimate
and substantial business justifications;"I 3 otherwise, the employer
would be "guilty of an unfair labor practice."' 64 In an economic
strike, such justification exists only if "the jobs claimed by the
strikers are occupied by workers hired as permanent replacements
during the strike in order to continue operations. ' 61 To have such
a "legitimate and substantial business justification," the offer must
indeed be for a permanent position:
If an employer hires replacements without a commitment or understanding
that the job is permanent and also discharges the strikers, the interest in
protecting economic strikers by an entitlement to reinstatement is not overcome by a substantial business justification. The employer has not had to
offer the jobs on a permanent basis as an inducement to continuing his
operations."6

Indeed, allowing strikers to be hired on a permanent basis,
like the rest of the doctrine originating from Mackay, 67 is predicated on the necessity for a "permanent" offer to induce workers
to become strikebreakers, 8 to reinforce the employer's "right to
protect and continue his business . "69 The holding in Belknap
can be seen, however, as inconsistent with, and perhaps a repudia62. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
63. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967) (quoting NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)).
64. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. at 378. "[T]he status of the striker as an employee
continues until he has obtained 'other regular and substantially equivalent employment.'"
Id. at 381 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982)).
65. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. at 379.
66. NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 1980). The Board
has held similarly: see Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 214, 220 (1974),
enfd, 514 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1975).
67. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
68. "The justification for not discharging replacements in order to reinstate strikers
...is the need of the employer to assure permanent employment to the replacements so
that the necessary labor force can be obtained to maintain operations during a strike."
Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
69. Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345.
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tion of, this focus.
The issue here is indeed a critical one. The justification given
by the Court in Mackay when it preserved the right to hire strikebreakers despite the passage of the Wagner Act was the overriding need-a*nd hence right-of management to continue the operation of the business. In the face of this, the rights of strikers,
expressed literally in the Act, were rejected: the hiring of strikebreakers was held to be an action beyond governmental regulation. The hiring of strikebreakers on a permanent basis was similarly held to be beyond the Act's scope: "The assurance by [the
employer] to those who accepted employment during the strike
that if they so desired their places might be permanent was not an
unfair labor practice. . . ."70 The strikers' rights, protected by the
National Labor Relations Act, as well as the national labor policy
expressed therein, were held to be outweighed by this need of
management.2
In Belknap, on the other hand, the Court allowed this management conduct to be regulated through the imposition of state
tort liability. From this, it is clear the the Court now considers the
rights of the strikebreakers, as expressed through the possible imposition of state liability, as superior to the inherent rights of
management that were held paramount in Mackay. These policies,
however, when taken together, present an ideological paradox: in
a true balancing of interests, if the job rights of the strikebreakers
are to take precedence over management's needs, then why don't
the rights of the strikers?
The logical conclusion to this analysis-that management's
right to keep the business operating is no longer the Court's paramount consideration-is that the "balancing" of Mackay is wrong,
and that strikebreakers should not be hired in the first place-a2
7
conclusion facially congruent with section thirteen of the Act.
The Court also dismissed the obvious inconsistency between
the "employment contracts" of the replacements and the collective bargaining agreement by the use of the jurisdictional caveat
70. Id. at 346.
71. See supra note 31.
72. "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982).
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inJ.L Case Co. v. NLRB, 73 that the Board "has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect of such contracts except as to their effect
on matters within its jurisdiction. 7 4 In his dissent, Justice Brennan avers that this analysis is not on point: unlike the "individual
contracts" in Belknap, the contracts in Case "were not tainted by
any unfair labor practice, arguable or otherwise. ' ' 7 Moreover,
Case did not consider whether the actions brought by the employees were preempted by federal law;78 preemption was not the substantive issue in question.
The problems with this analysis, however, are much deeper
than those explicated by Justice Brennan-the Court has ignored
the basic focus of Case in order to utilize the largely semantic "exception" therein. The purpose for the general rule in Case was
that "[i]ndividual contracts . . . may not be availed of

. .

. to

forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."' 7 This was to insure that individual contracts of employment would not be used to frustrate the
collective bargaining structure. In Belknap, the "individual contracts" with the replacements accomplish just that. By reverting to
the use of these "individual contracts," management need not
bargain with the union; the possibility of civil liability can be used
as a justification for the employer's refusal to bargain in good
faith.78 In Case itself, the Court was quite specific on the interpretation to be given to such agreements:
We are not called upon to say that under no circumstances can an individual
enforce an agreement more advantageous than a collective agreement, but
we find the mere possibility that such agreements might be made no ground
for holding generally that individual contracts may survive or surmount collective ones. The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with
suspicion on such individual advantages79

Where the private, individual agreements interfere with the
collective rights of the group expressed in the collective bargaining agreement, then the individual agreements must yield. Here,
the agreements of the strikebreakers for "permanent replace73. 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text,
74. Case, 321 U.S. at 340.
75. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3199 n.14.
76. Id.

77. Case, 321 U.S. at 337.
78. See infra text accompanying note 119.
79.

Case, 321 U.S. at 338.
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ment" almost by definition interfere with the rights of the collective agreement by specifically denying. strikers the right to return
to their jobs.80 This conflict is reflected in the terms of the different contractual agreements: if the replacements are members of
the bargaining unit,"' then a seniority clause (found in almost
every collective bargaining agreement) will effectively terminate
the replacements even without management action. 2 The validity
of the contracts between management and the strikebreakers,
then, has a very real and substantial effect upon the creation and
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement-certainly an
area within the scope of the Board.
The conflict between the replacements' contract and the collective bargaining agreement was, of course, specifically allowed
by Mackay. What is important to see, however, is not that Mackay
and Case are fundamentally inconsistent, but that the contracts
with the replacements easily affect matters within the jurisdiction
of the Board. Because of this, the Board clearly should have jurisdiction over the validity of the replacements' contract, despite the
caveat in Case relied upon by the Court.
In summary, the Court's analysis denying preemption under
the Machinists doctrine clearly fails: the discussion of congressional
intent is not documented and the effects of the opinion on the
balance of power between management and labor are misread.
The Court's reliance on case law, moreover, ignores the fundamental purposes of Case in order to utilize-incorrectly-an exception to its general rule.
The analysis of the majority opinion in rejecting the Garmon
doctrine fares no better. To dismiss the Garmon doctrine, the
Court relied on the "identical question" analysis of Sears v.
Carpenters.3 The analysis of Sears, however, is used without recognizing the real differences between Sears and Belknap. In Sears,
Justice Stevens' primary concern with the arguably protected
80. In Belknap, the basis of the misrepresentation charge was the express written message to the employees that "we have no intention of getting rid of the permanent replacement employees just in order to provide jobs for the replaced strikers if and when the
Union calls off the strike." Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3175.
81. See C.H. Guenther & Son, 174 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1203 (1969), enfd, 427 F.2d 983,
987 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Getlan Iron Works, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B.
864, 867 (1969).
82. See Bio-Science Laboratories, 209 N.L.R.B. 796, 797 (1974).
83. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
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branch of the Garmon doctrine lay with the inability of management-the party instituting the cause of action-to bring an unfair labor practice charge before the Board:
The primary-jurisdiction rationale justifies pre-emption only in situations in
which an aggrieved party has a reasonable opportunity either to invoke the
Board's jurisdiction himself or else to induce his adversary to do so. In this
case, Sears could not directly obtain a Board ruling on the question whether
the Union's trespass was federally protected. . . . The primary-jurisdiction
rationale unquestionably requires that when the same controversy may be
presented to the state court or the NLRB, it must be presented to the
Board. But that rationale does not extend to cases in which an employer has
no acceptable method of invoking, or inducing the Union to invoke, the jurisdiction of the Board."

In Belknap, Justice White uses this justification by showing that, if
the state causes of action are preempted, the strikers would be unable to bring suit in state court, 5 The proper question that would
trigger the Sears analysis is, of course, whether the replacements
could institute a proceeding before the Board. It is clear, however,
that not only could the replacements bring an action before the
Board against the company for violating section 8(a) of the Act,"0
they could bring charges against the union for violations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). 87 The unavailability of forum that Jus,84. Sears, 436 U.S. at 201.

85. Belknap, 103 S.Ct. at 3183.
86. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), deems an unfair labor
practice any employer's actions that "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7"; these include the "right to refrain from any or
all of such activities . . . ." Id.
87. Those sections state:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7 [29 U.S.C. § 157]...
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-

ployee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(2) (1982). See Local 1104, Communications Workers v. NLRB, 520

F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975) (union violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) by denying union membership to individuals because they worked during a strike), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051
(1976); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 218 N.L.R.B. 396 (1975) (union committed

unfair labor practice by failing to process employee's grievance because of his nonmembership in the union); NLRB v. Local No. 2 United Assoc. of Journeymen, 360 F.2d 428 (2d
Cir. 1966) (action of union in attempting to cause discharge of four employees because
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tice Stevens feared in Sears simply did not apply to the situation in
Belknap.
In Sears, Justice Stevens was also concerned with the preemption of suits concerning conduct arguably prohibited by the Act.
While the "rule" espoused is the same as that articulated
above-whether or not the question presented to the Court and
the Board are identical-the underlying rationale, taken from
Farmer v. Carpenters,"" is most illuminating:
First, there existed a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from
the challenged conduct. Second, although the challenged conduct occurred
in the course of a labor dispute and an unfair labor practice charge could
have been filed, the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim entailed
little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the Labor
Board.89

Where the intrusion of the state cause of action could cause "interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the Labor Board,""0
preemption is called for by this analysis-although not by the majority in Belknap. A state law cause of action, such as that in Belknap, however, does indeed, as a result of this holding, have a deleterious effect on the Board's ability to adjudicate in this area.9 1
Because of this. interference, the use of Sears to deny preemption
is clearly inconsistent with its logical and legal underpinnings.
III.

A.

EFFECTS OF

Belknap

Strikebreakers

At first, strikebreakers appear to be the only beneficiaries of
the Court's opinion in Belknap. They may now enter actions in
state court without fear of dismissal on the basis of federal labor
law preemption. There is, however, a tremendous difference between being able to bring a suit, and being able to win a judgment
on that suit; all of this preemption litigation is for naught if the
replacements cannot win their damage actions under state law.
Two problems confront strikebreakers in actions for damthey were not members of the union constituted an unfair labor practice). Reference to the
strikebreakers' ability to bring these charges is made in the NLRB's amicus brief. See Brief
for the National Labor Relations Board at 21, n.11, Belknap.
88. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
89.
90.
91.

Sears, 436 U.S. at 196.
Id.
See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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ages. First, to establish an action under contract, the strikebreakers must overcome the formidable hurdle of the doctrine of employment at will. 92 Second, they must establish their actions for
fraud and misrepresentation. Neither of these tasks is easy.
Under the traditional analysis, employers who are unencum-

bered by a collective bargaining agreement "may dismiss their
employes at will . . . for good cause, for no cause, or even for
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong."9 While several exceptions have developed for this general rule of employment at will, it is still well settled in every
jurisdiction.94
If the employee does not give the employer consideration in
addition to the services to be performed, state courts have traditionally construed the contract for permanent employment as an
employment at will relationship. 95 The traditional analysis has two
self-sufficient parts. In the absence of consideration in addition to
the work to be performed by the employee, courts have found no
92. The rule of employment at will, theoretically based upon notions of mutuality of
contract, was first stated by practitioner and treatise writer Horace Gray Wood: "[T]he
rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is primafaciea hiring at will. . . it is an
indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this respect there is
no distinction between domestic and other servants." H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT §

134 (1877). For a good summary of the history and development of "Wood's rule," see
generally Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HiST.
118, 125-27 (1976).
93. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). See also 1 C. LABATr,
MASTER AND SERVANT § 183 (2d ed. 1913). An excellent but somewhat dated analysis of the
widening exceptions to this rule is Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). For a good
esource for the current state of at will employment, see also PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
NJUST DISMISSAL AND AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT (1980).
94. See Blades, supra note 93. See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.4TH 544 (1982). In the last few
years, courts have been willing to find contracts when specific, written management guidelines, usually expressed in employee handbooks, have been violated by the termination of
the employee. See Toussant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 NW.2d 880
(1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982). This trend
must be viewed as in its infancy, however, an exception to the general rule; while its scope
may indeed be growing, it is by no means generally accepted. See Heideck v. Kent General
Hospital, 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Wood v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 717 (N.D. Ga. 1982), affd mem., 710 F.2d 838 (11th Cir.
1983); Aldahir v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 420 So. 2d 714 (La.
Ct. App. 1982); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982);
Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
95. See 53 AM. Ju. 2D Master and Servant § 32 (1970).
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mutuality of contract to support the employee's claim to employment for any specific duration.9" In addition, the indefinite temporal character of an offer of "permanent employment" has traditionally rendered the relationship terminable at the will of either
party.9 7 Unless the employee can show that the employment contract was for a specific duration, and that the employer has re96. See Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Maryland
law); White v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Bd., 650 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying
Mississippi law); Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964)
(applying Indiana law), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270
F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (applying Illinois law); Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d
347 (7th Cir. 1955) (applying Illinois law); Fibreboard Prod., Inc. v. Townsend, 202 F.2d
180 (9th Cir. 1953) (applying California law); An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Technological Univ.,
493 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (applying Michigan law); United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Gregory, 281 Ala. 264, 201 So. 2d 853 (1967); National Union Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram,
275 Ala. 310, 154 So. 2d 666 (1963); Ferreyra v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 231 Cal. App. 2d
426, 41 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1964); Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880

(1964); Gressley v. Williams, 193 Cal. App. 2d 636, 14 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1961); Beeler v. H &
R Block, Inc., 487 P.2d 569 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 118
A.2d 316 (1955); Carter v. Bartek, 142 Conn. 448, 114 A.2d 923 (1955); Russel & Axon v.
Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d
241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ingram, 158 Ga. App. 715, 282 S.E.2d 186 (1981);
Moody v. Bogue, 310 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981); Griffith v. Sollay Found. Drilling,
Inc., 373 So. 2d 979 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App.
471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Salisbury v. McLouth Steel Corp., 93 Mich. App. 248, 287
N.W.2d 195 (1979); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980);
Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979); Edwards v.
Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1979), affd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S. 2d
327 (1980); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979). This
analysis assumes that the state court will equate an offer of "permanent replacement" as an
offer of "permanent employment." If not, then the strikebreaker is surely an employee at
will. See also infra note 100.
In addition, in the few instances where it has been pled, courts have held the agreement
to work during a strike, and the suffering of any deleterious effects therefrom, to be insufficient consideration to support promises of permanent employment to strikebreakers. See,
e.g., Albers v. Wilson & Co., 184 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1960); Hope v. National Air
Lines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Rape v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 136 Miss.
38, 100 So. 585 (1924).
97. See Russel & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Hope
v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Mallory v. Jack, 281
Mich. 156, 274 N.W. 746 (1937); Bolles v. Sachs, 37 Minn. 315, 33 N.W. 862 (1887);
Ingram-Day Lumber Co. v. Rodgers, 105 Miss. 244, 62 So. 230 (1913); Savarese v. Pyrene
Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237 (1952); Bird v.J.L. Prescott Co., 89 N.J.L. 591, 99 A.
380 (1916); Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943); Seiss v.
McClintic-Marshall Corp., 324 Pa. 201, 188 A. 109 (1936); Ogden v. Philadelphia & W.C.
Traction Co., 202 Pa. 480, 52 A. 9 (1902); Lightcap v. Keaggy, 128 Pa. Super. 348, 194 A.
347 (1937).
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ceived consideration in addition to the work paid for, the employment relationship will be seen as at will, and the employee may be
terminated at any time for any reason.
Whether or not strike replacements can prevail in contract
actions is highly questionable at best. Although the 'employees in
Belknap might conceivably have been able to establish that the
company's representations98 constituted "management policy
guidelines" sufficient to establish a valid employment contract,
two problems exist in applying this analysis to future disputes.
First, the "management policy guideline" exception to the general rule of employment at will is limited." Second, given the
holding in Belknap, it is extremely unlikely that management will
make such representations in the future. Without these additional
representations, the strikebreakers will lose. It is therefore most
unlikely that an offer of permanent replacement will lead to liability, assuming, of course, that the courts will equate an offer of
''permanent replacement" to an offer of "permanent
employment." 100
Permanent replacements fare little better in using company
representations like those in Belknap in tort actions for fraud. The
standard of proof for fraud is quite high. To succeed, the em98. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3176. See also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94.
100. See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.3D 226 (1974). The Court in Belknap made no distinction between offers of permanent replacement and permanent employment, and spoke
of them interchangeably. See supra text accompanying note 46. If such a distinction should
be made, however, there develops an interesting paradox. If the state court judge equates
an offer of permanent replacement with an offer of permanent employment, then the re-

placement will generally be considered an employee at will, terminable at any time for any
reason. If the judge is unwilling to make this analogy, however, then he must be equating
the strikebreaker's position with that of the striker replaced-a member of the bargaining
unit. If the strikebreaker is a member of the bargaining unit, he is then bound by the
collective bargaining agreement that will mandate his discharge; his individual contract has
no effect under Case, 321 U.S. at 332. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
There exists another line of analysis, not addressed in Belknap, that would lead to employer liability for the discharge of an at will employee: contractual limitations on termination that have been found to be implied from the public policy. See Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d I (1st Cir.
1977). But see Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co.,
117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319
A.2d 174 (1974). The vast majority of cases refute this doctrine, which was not pled in the
instant case.
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ployee must prove that the representations were known to be false
at the time that they were made, that the statements were made to
induce action on the part of the employee, and that the employee
reasonably relied on the false statement. 10 1
Again, problems exist. A mere breach of promise, or an erroneous prediction of a future event (such as management's prediction of the outcome of an unfair labor practice adjudication) may
not constitute the basis of a claim for fraud. 02 The employee
must show that at the time the representation was made, management intended to violate its promise,' 03 or knew that the promise
was false. 0 4 In most cases involving permanent replacements,
however, the intent of management in making representations
similar to that found in Belknap is precisely the opposite; these
representations are made to fulfill the "substantial business justification" test of NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.'05 to allow the retention of the permanent employees after the end of an economic
strike. 06
In certain jurisdictions, then, permanent replacements might
be able to establish causes of action for breach of contract and
misrepresentation. In the vast majority of cases, however, the
company will not be held liable, and the scrapping of federal preemption will be for naught.
B. Management
Under the legal scheme now in effect as a result of the holding in Belknap, management may no longer be free to universally
hire replacements as an economic weapon to counteract strikes.
The degree to which management's activities are "chilled" in this
101. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
102. See Lyxell v. Vautrin, 604 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1979).
103. See Shear v. National Rifle Ass'n, 606 F.2d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
104. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967) (quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26,
34 (1967)).
106. The NLRB viewed Belknap's representations in its amicus brief as follows:
The statements which the company had the replacements sign in this case (citations omitted) were not designed to lull the replacements into a false security
concerning their prospects of continued employment but to satisfy the burden
the Company might be called upon to meet in the event of litigation, i.e. to
show that it had hired permanent, not temporary, replacements. Such statements are common in the hiring of striking replacements.
Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 18, n.10.
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area will be directly proportional to management's perception of
the risk of the imposition of civil liability. Several factors will affect this perception: the case law of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in question, the specific representations made to the strikebreakers, and the degree to which management would wish to
have an amicable settlement with the union all play a part. The
effects of the decision on management can best be seen by an
analysis of the legal and non-legal consequences resulting from
the possible fact situations of hiring replacements after an impasse; these are presented below as "models of management
conduct."
1. The Hiring of "Conditional" Replacements. This is the
model of hiring replacements suggested by the majority opinion. 107 Under this model, management will hire replacements on a

"conditional" basis when it perceives a significant risk in hiring on
a strictly "permanent" basis. Because the offer of employment
would be "conditioned" by the possibility of settlement with the
union, management would not be subject to civil liability in the
case of a settlement, or the adjudication of an unfair labor practice. This course of conduct would leave management in much the
same position as the hiring of permanent replacements before Belknap as far as the legal consequences are concerned.
There does exist, however, a significant practical difference
between the new doctrine and the old: if the employees are hired
on a "conditional" basis, the incentive to potential replacements
given by the "permanent" status of employment would be negated. It may therefore be more difficult for management to hire
replacements in those situations where the offer of permanent employment is most needed: in the face of a strong union. This cannot help but have severe effects on the balance of power between
labor and management. Belknap has effectively removed the economic weapon granted in Mackay from the grasp of the employer
who needs to offer "permanent" positions to keep the business
operating.
In the hands of management that already has a great deal of
bargaining strength, on the other hand, such a "conditional" offer
produces an additional weapon: the absolute discretion as to
whether or not to settle the strike. In his concurrence, Justice
107. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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Blackmun summarized this effect:
The Court's conditional promise achieves only one thing: it permits an employer, during settlement negotiations with the Union, to threaten to retain
replacement employees in preference to returning strikers despite the fact
that the employer has not promised to do so. 108

The reason this is so is the aforementioned dual nature of the
"conditional replacement" employment status.1 0 9 While the status
of the replacement is "conditional," i.e. non-permanent, as far as
the imposition of state law liability is concerned, the majority
opinion holds that the status is "permanent" enough to fulfill the
"legitimate and substantial business justification" test of NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co.110 and refuse strikers their jobs. There is no
doubt that the Court's decision in Belknap grants management a
significant new weapon, the very antithesis of the federal policy
inherent in the Act. Justice Blackmun continues:
The naked interest in making such a threat, silently endorsed in the Court's
opinion, could not be less legitimate under the NLRA. From the employer's
point of view, one benefit of offering strike replacements permanent employment is that strikers become fearful that they will lose their jobs. But it
is clear that creating this fear, which discourages union membership and
concerted activities, is a deleterious side-effect of, rather than a legitimate
justification for, the power to hire permanent strike replacements. 111

What the Court has done, in effect, is to emasculate the "substantial business justification" test of Fleetwood Trailer. Management
no longer needs to hire replacements on a permanent basis in order to retain them at the end of an economic strike. Consequently, management can now threaten the union with the retention of any replacement. The effects of this on the union's
bargaining power, as will be seen below,1 12 is disastrous.
It is clear that the Court has created a new weapon for management, while the weapon is available only to those that already
have sufficient bargaining power to be able to attract conditional
108. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3186.
109. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
110. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967). Prior to Belknap, in order
for an employer to keep replacements-and not rehire the strikers-he would have to
show a "legitimate and substantial business justification." Id. at 380. The fulfillment of this
test traditionally required the hiring of strike replacements on a permanent basis. See supra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
111. Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3186.
112. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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replacements in the first place. The Court has created a twoedged sword that can be used only by those who need it least.
2. The Hiring of Permanent Replacements. There are basically
three separate situations where management would hire strike
replacements on a "permanent" basis after the holding in Belknap:
first, where management's position is so weak that in order to hire
the requisite replacements to keep the business alive, it must make
permanent offers regardless of possible civil liability; second,
where management is reasonably sure that in the jurisdiction
where the hiring is done that liability will not lie; and third, where
management has no intention of settling with the union.
The purpose of the doctrine of permanent replacement,
which emanated from the famous dictum in Mackayn" and was reaffirmed in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., n1 is the underlying belief
that management has the right to take whatever measures necessary to keep the business operating. For the small, weak businessperson, this would appear to be abrogated by the holding in Belknap; if management is found guilty of an unfair labor practice,
the company may be forced to. open itself to civil liability in order
to comply with federal labor law. This is precisely the situation
feared by the dissent in Belknap; recognizing the possibility for liability, management may be deterred from hiring on the permanent basis necessary to keep the business operating. Even more
important, however, is that if replacements are hired on a permanent basis, then the federal policy of strike settlement 1 would be
thwarted:
If an employer is confronted with potential liability for discharging workers
he has hired to replace striking employees, he is likely to be much less willing to enter into a settlement agreement calling for the dismissal of unfair
labor practice charges and for the reinstatement of strikers. Instead, he is

113. The "famous dictum":
Although § 13 provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," it does not
follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
114. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
115. See Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962) (strike settlements
held necessary for the institution of labor peace, and therefore enforceable under section
301 of the Act). See also section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
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much more likely to refuse to settle and to litigate the charges at issue while
retaining the replacements. 16

In addition to the problems that this will raise with the increased amount of litigation before the Board 117 and the deterioration of the union's power, 1 " a serious spectre, not addressed by
the Court appears. Under a permanent replacement analysis,
management may use the possibility of civil liability to effectively
block its duty to bargain in good faith." 9 Management is now
given a reasonable excuse to refuse to settle with the union, i.e. so
that it will not be subject to actions for damages. It will be virtually impossible, moreover, for the Board or the courts to determine if such a refusal to bargain is or is not in good faith; this
would require the second-guessing of management's prerogative,
a chore that both the Board and the courts are loath to perform.
In Belknap the Court finds it unfortunate, but necessary, that
federal labor policy be sacrificed to accommodate the interests of
the individual strikebreakers and the state law that "supports"
them. The majority either does not realize, or does not care,that
by allowing these state causes of action, it has added to the inequality of bargaining power in labor-management relations. By allowing state regulation through tort liability, the Court has denied
those firms small or weak enough to require the use of permanent
replacements the use of their most potent economic weapon.
Those companies that have a preponderance of economic power,
on the other hand, have been given a method to effectively neutralize the duty to bargain.
C.

The National Labor Relations Board

Belknap will have two principal effects upon the National Labor Relations Board: the denigration of its authority as the federal
agency responsible for the maintenance of labor peace, and the
possible addition to its caseload of an overwhelming number of
unfair labor practice complaints.
The primary focus of the Garmon "primary jurisdiction" doc116.
117.
118.
119.

Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3194 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
The duty to bargain in good faith is mandated by section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 29

U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
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trine1 20 lays in the congressional determination that the federal
interest in labor peace is best served by a consolidated adjudicatory body.12 ' The conflicting effect other laws and causes of action
have on the behavior of the parties, however, is increasingly reducing the Board's jurisdiction. This cannot help but have a deleterious. effect on the Board as the coordinator of a uniform, federal labor policy.
On a less esoteric level, Belknap creates serious practical
problems for the Board. As was seen above, the holding may damage the federal interest in strike settlement.1 22 Before Belknap, approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of the unfair labor practice charges filed with the Board were resolved through
settlement, not adjudication. 23 Of course, only a portion of the
8,000 claims annually before the Board involve strike replacements. Nevertheless, since management has a significant interest
in adjudicating all claims if there is either the chance of escaping
the civil liability allowed in Belknap or the possibility of using that
"liability" as a pretext in order to avoid bargaining with the
union, a substantial rise in the Board's caseload is assured.' 2 '
120. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
121. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953) ("It is the business
of the Board to give co-ordinated effect to the policies of the Act."); NLRB v. Nash-Finch
Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971) ("the Board is the sole protector of the 'national interest' defined
with particularity in the Act").
122. See supra notes 107-08, 115-16 and accompanying text.
123. NationalLabor Relations Board Case Backlog (Part2): Hearing Before a Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1984) (statement
of Donald A. Zimmerman, Member, NLRB). "Each percentage change in the settlement
rate produces a significant change in the number of cases coming to the Board." Id.
124. Indeed, this increase in cases would occur at a time when the Board already has a
backlog of cases unprecedented in its history. See generally Hearing, supra note 123. The
backlog is generally attributed to personnel changes on the Board, and the Board's "conscious decision to concentrate initially on issuing lead cases in certain major areas." Id. at
46 (statement of Donald L. Dotson, Chairman, NLRB).
There is some concern, moreover, that a contributing factor to the NLRB's delay is the
political motivation of the current Board. See Effron, Unions, Employers Criticize Backlog of
NLRB Cases, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 6 ("It is clearly the labor lawyers and
their clients, however, who are the most concerned about the backlog . . . some flatly
accuse the board of intentionally going slow, as another device in the board's shift toward
legal and policy viewpoints that favor the management perspective").
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D. Labor
The effect of Belknap on labor is dependent on which model
of management conduct, as outlined above, is utilized. In the case
of an offer of permanent replacement by management, the effect
on labor is clear: since management will not be willing to open
itself up to civil liability by reaching a settlement with the union
that would displace the strikebreakers, the likelihood of the union
being able to bargain for the return of the striking workers virtually disappears. Normally, however, the offer of permanent replacement will be given only in those situations where the union's
position is weak in the first place-i.e. when management does
not have an interest in having the strikers return. The possibility
of civil liability, whether or not it can be realized under state law, will
then be used by management to refuse to bargain with the union.
This tips the scales of the contractual balance of power between
the parties.
In the case of replacements conditionally hired, labor may be
in exactly the same position outlined above. Because of the dual
nature of the conditional offer of employment, 2 5 the decision
whether or not strikers may retain their jobs is solely a matter of
management discretion. Before Belknap, if management had not
made offers of permanent replacement, then it would not fulfill
the "substantial business justification" test of Fleetwood Trailer12"
which would allow it to keep the strikebreakers after the end of
an economic strike. If management now makes "conditional" replacement offers, however, it may either keep the strikebreakers if
it desires, as the conditional offer fulfills the "substantial business
justification" test, or discharge them without fear of liability.
Neither course of action is legally mandated. In either case, however, it will become increasingly clear to union members that their
representatives may not be able to bargain for full reinstatement
after a strike. Members' confidence in the union will wane, as will
their willingness to strike-which, in the end, is labor's only
weapon. This clearly has an effect on the balance of power; it cannot help but be reflected at the bargaining table.
125. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
126. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
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CONCLUSION

In denying preemption in Belknap v. Hale, the Supreme Court
ignored both the purposes underlying federal preemption doctrine and the effects upon the parties that are contrary to the purposes of federal policy. Through the mechanical application of the
"rules" of the earlier cases, the majority successfully circumvented
a realistic understanding and application of the preemption
doctrine.
The decision itself has tremendous effects on the parties and
the balance of power in labor-management relations. The economic weapon of permanent replacements, granted by the Court
in Mackay, has effectively been taken away from those weak employers who need it most. When the weapon can still be used, it
will likely function more as a pretext to shield management from
its duty to bargain than for its designated purpose. The federal
interest in strike settlement is transformed into an additional
mulch of frequently spurious adjudication. Labor's only real
weapon-the right to strike-is again successfully undermined.
The power of the union is diminished both at the bargaining table
and in the eyes of the workers. The supposed beneficiary of all
this, the strikebreaker, is left high and dry, freed from the nets of
federal law, but beached on the traditions of at will employment.
In Belknap, the Court sacrificed a number of important federal interests in order to allow the strikebreakers' suits. The
strikebreakers, however, far from being vindicated, are doomed
to lose their suits in state court. In light of this, a uniform federal
labor policy has been sacrificed for nothing.
This result should not, however, be unexpected, given the
long-standing conflict of assumptions underlying the existence of
permanent replacements. Belknap tells us that management's right
to continue the operation of the business is no longer the paramount consideration of the Court-that other interests must be
accommodated. However, if this is so, then the justification for
allowing the hiring of strikebreakers in the first place, as expressed in Mackay and later law, disappears. Strikebreakers have
not been dispensed with, but the justification for hiring them has.
Given this, the current morass that this doctrine creates out of
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what should have been a coherent and uniform federal labor policy will undoubtedly continue.
KEVIN J. FAY

